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ARTICLES
THE HISTORY, NATURE, AND REACH OF THE ALIEN TORT
CLAIMS ACT
JordanJ. Pause

Federal statutes exist that permit civil sanctions against violators of
international law and incorporate international law by reference.
Domestically, it is the statute that forms the direct basis for a civil suit
against the perpetrator, while international normative content and even

relevant sanctions or remedies are incorporated indirectly through the
statutory basis. Nonetheless, specific remedies can be tailored by the
judiciary. An example is the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which states

that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States."' By enacting the ATCA as a means of

determining what claims are cognizable before the courts, Congress chose
to exercise its constitutional power to incorporate international law by
reference, which Supreme Court cases have recognized is a congressional
prerogative not to be second-guessed by the judiciary.2

* Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston.
1. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2004). The 1789 version used the phrase "all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only." An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,
ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). It is not known whether the word "treaty" can extend to
international agreements of the United States that do not rest on two-thirds consent of the U.S.
Senate and were most likely unknown in 1789, such as congressional-executive or sole-presidential
executive agreements. Cf Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
2. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946) (reiterating the recognitions in Exparte
Quinn regarding articles 12 and 15 of the 1916 Articles of War (what are now 10 U.S.C. §§ 818,
821), which "incorporated by reference" customary and treaty-based laws ofwar as offenses against
the laws of the United States without listing numerous war crimes thereby implemented or their
elements); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1942).
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The ATCA, therefore, is no ordinary statute. It has been in existence in
the United States since 1789 and had achieved early and informing
precedential attention with respect to violations of international law by
U.S. and foreign perpetrators here and abroad,3 but significantly increased

It is no objection that Congress ... has not itself undertaken to codify that branch
of international law or to mark its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define
by statute all the acts which the law condemns. . . . Congress had the choice of
crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail every offense against the law
of war, or of adopting ... [by reference]. It chose the latter course.
Id; United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158-62 (1820) (regarding 18 U.S.C. § 1651,
Congress has the choice to define and incorporate "by a reference" piracy "under the law of
nations"); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 13-14, 64-65
n.133, 391 n.101 (2d ed. 2003); see also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U.S. 428, 435 (1989) (regarding the congressional exercise of power, in part, under the U.S.
Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 10, to "define and punish" when allowing suits under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1602, addressed in part below); 49 U.S.C. §
1472(k)(I)(d)(ii)-(iii) (Supp. V 1987) (incorporating offenses under anti-hijacking and antiaircraft
sabotage treaties by reference); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (incorporating violations of "treaties of the
United States" for habeas purposes); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4) (incorporating alien rights,
exemptions, etc. "the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of nations"); 28 U.S.C. §
1330(a) (regarding nonimmunity "under any applicable international agreement"); 28 U.S.C. §
1604 (concerning suits against foreign states and foreign state entities and nonimmunity in
accordance with "existing international agreements"); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (regarding suits and
nonimmunity for takings "in violation of international law"); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(e)(2) (regarding
suits under § 1605(a)(7) for "hostage taking" incorporating "the meaning given that term in" a
treaty); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(e) (3}(regarding suits for "aircraft sabotage" incorporating "the meaning
given that term in" another treaty); 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (concerning attachments and execution in
accordance with "existing international agreements"); 21 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(6) (adopting exceptions
regarding "responsibilities under applicable Status ofForces arrangements"); 18 U.S.C. § 3185(14)
(concerning extradition for piracy "by the law ofnations"); 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2003) (incorporating
offenses under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocols by reference); infra text accompanying
notes 22-23. In a concurring opinion in Al Odah v. United States, Judge Randolph seemed to be
unaware of the Supreme Court rulings on this matter and seemed to miss the points that Congress
has acted through legislation to incorporate international law by reference in the ATCA and various
other statutes and that this form of time-honored incorporation is constitutionally appropriate.
Compare Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J.
concurring).
3. See, e.g., Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 943 (D.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9,895)
(federal courts are "particularly by law vested with authority where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the laws of nations, &c."); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D. S.C. 1795) (No.
1,607) ("the original cause arose at sea" and the ATCA allows the court "to take cognizance of the
cause" between a Spanish claimant and an agent of a British national); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58-59
(1795).
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[T]here can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured
by these acts of hostility [in foreign territory on the West coast of Africa] have a
remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being
expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in
violation of the law of nations, or a treaty of the United States.
Id. (emphasis in original); United States v. Greene, 26 F. Cas. 33, 33 (C.C.D. Maine 1827) (No.
15,258) (Story, J.: Section 9 of the judiciary act "gives no right to any individual to sue in those
courts, with the single exception of causes 'where an alien sues for a tort only....'); M'Grath v.
Candalero, 16 F. Cas. 128 (D. S.C. 1794) (No. 6,810) ("tort"remedy, ATCA addressed by analogy:
"Ifan alien sue here for a tort under the law of nations or a treaty... the suit will be sustained");
Jansen v. The Vrow ChristinaMagdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356, 358 (D. S.C. 1794) (No. 7,216) (dictum:
"the powers of the district courts are expressed ... as to civil causes ... where an alien sues for a
tort only"); PAUST, supra note 2, at 14, 63, 233, 286-87 nn.479, 481, 312 n.575, 314 n.584; Jordan
J. Paust, Litigating Human Rights: A Commentary on the Comments, 4 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 81, 84-85
(1981); infra text accompanying note 11. The ATCA did not rest on admiralty jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Wilson v. Pierce, 30 F. Cas. 150, 154 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1852) (No. 17,826). As it does today,
in the 1790s the ATCA applied to conduct and/or injuries or other harm here or abroad, by U.S. or
foreign violators. See also infra text accompanying notes 5-7. It is not unusual that the ATCA, as
expected in the 1790s, is extraterritorial in its reach, since violations of customary international law
contemplated and covered by the statute implicate universal jurisdiction (which provides the United
States a well-known and venerable competence to enact legislation that is extraterritorial even if
there are no contacts with the forum). See, e.g., United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184,
197 (1820) (piracy "is against all, and punished by all ... within this universal jurisdiction");
Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 156 (1795) (Paterson, J.); id. at 159-61 (Iredell, J.) (Iredell,
J.: "all ... trespasses committed against the general law of nations, are enquirable, and may be
proceeded against, in any nation"); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,240 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Estate
of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 499-500 (9th Cir. 1992); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999
F. Supp. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 1998); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 n.25, 193 (D. Mass.
1995); PAUST, supra note 2, at 420-23, 432-41; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878
(2d Cir. 1980) ("whenever an alleged [violator] ... is found and served with process ... within our
borders, [28 U.S.C.] § 1350 provides federal jurisdiction."). Moreover, extraterritoriality can be
"inferred from the nature of the offenses" covered, the fact that "prohibitions are on their face allinclusive," and "the overall purpose of the Act." United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506,
1515-17 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980)
("citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922)."). The nature of the ATCA clearly
involves violations of customary international law and treaties which can implicate universal
jurisdiction; the prohibitions are all-inclusive, reaching "any" relevant tort, and the broad language
contains no geographic limits; and the overall purpose and demonstrable history have been to
provide rights to a remedy and to avoid denials of justice to aliens concerning infractions here or
abroad as well as to protect the United States from consequences that might follow if such rights
are violated. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 5-7, 11-13. The violations expressly covered,
implicating universal jurisdiction, are also "not logically dependent on their locality for ... [U.S.]
jurisdiction." See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. It is also noteworthy that human rights had been of
significant interest to the Founders and Framers, have identifiable constitutional bases, and have
been used by federal courts since the Founding. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 193-223. Indeed,
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use of the ATCA has occurred since the landmark decision in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala4 in 1980. The ATCA requires that a plaintiff be an alien,'
although a defendant can be a U.S or foreign perpetrator of a private6
(individual, group or corporate)7 or public character.! It provides that an

Chief Justice Marshall recognized in 1810 that our judicial tribunals "are established ... to decide
on human rights." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810); PAUST, supra note 2, at
193-202, 209. After the 1790 cases and opinion, the next major focus on the ATCA was consistent
in recognizing that the statute provides a "right of action and a forum" for a violation of a treaty by
a private U.S. company engaged in dredging activity along the Rio Grande that led to injuries to
property interests of foreign nationals abroad. See 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 251-54 (1907).
Apparently the next case to utilize the ATCA was Adra v. Clift. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857,
865 (D. Md. 1961) (involving misuse of a passport abroad by a private foreign national defendant
and issues with respect to child custody).
4. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
5. See, e.g., Jama v. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362-63 (D.N.J. 1998); Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250 (1907); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795).
6. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844(1 Ith Cir. 1996); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243-45;
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987);
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876; Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Barrueto
v. Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322
(N.D. Ga. 2002); Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 162; Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993);
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Adra, 195 F. Supp. at 865; Bolchos,
3 F. Cas. at 810 (Spanish claimant and an agent of a British national).
7. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 941 (2001); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 237-43; Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1266-67 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Presbyterian Church ofSudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 30820, 328, 333; Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 443-45 n.26 (D.N.J. 1999); Burger-Fisher v. DeGussa Corp., 65
F. Supp. 2d 248, 272-73 (D.N.J. 1999); Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 362-63; Doe v. Islamic Salvation
Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1998); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078,1090-95
(S.D. Fla. 1997); Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 891-92; Mushikiwabo, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4409; Adra, 195 F. Supp. at 857, 865; supra text accompanying notes 3 & 5. Concerning private
duties under international law, including human rights law, see also Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.); Weisshaus v. Swiss Bankers
Ass'n (In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig.), 225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157
F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Linder v. Portocarrero (The Contras), 963 F.2d 332, 336-37 (11th Cir.
1992); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro (The PLO), 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991); SanchezEspinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., dictum); Nguyen da Yen v.
Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227,231
(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860) (No. 15,329) (Campbell, J., in circuit) ("violations of human rights" by
private "citizens of the United States"); In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 114
F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (U.S. nationals' claims against Japanese corporations concerning
slave labor of former prisoners of war in violation of the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV had been
settled by a 1951 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Peace); Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private
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alien can sue for what we term a "tort" or "wrong"' "in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States"' 0 and, as the statute manifestly
requires, the substantive law to be applied is international law. With
respect to the ATCA, Filartiga followed what is now a long line of
decisions recognizing, consistently with identifiable expectations in the
1790s, that the ATCA is more than merely a jurisdictional statute since it

Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51 (1992); Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights
Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801 (2002) [hereinafter
Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities]; Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 149
(1977) ("terroristactivities .. .of individuals or groups ... are in clear disregard of human rights");
Johnson v. Unisys, Ltd., 13 H.L. 37 (A.C. 2001) (Lord Hoffmann) (private corporation's
responsibilities under domestic employment law are also "[s]ubject to observance of fundamental
human rights...."); Pushpanathan v. Canada, [1998] D.L.R. 231 (it is possible "for a non-state
actor to perpetuate human rights violations on a scale amounting to persecution" within the reach
of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1F(c), 189 U.N.T.S. 150, which deals
with denial of refugee protections to persons "guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations" which include the need to respect and observe human rights - also noting
a related practice of Australia); C.A. 294/93, Kadisha v. Kestenbaum, 46(2) P.D. 464, 530 (Barak,
J.) (human rights apply "also to the mutual relations between individuals themselves"); In Matter
of the Republic of the Philippines, 46 BverfGE 342,362 (2 BvM 1/76, Dec. 13, 1977) (direct duties
of private individuals are created in human rights law), addressed in Memorandum for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 21, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980); JORDAN
PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 106-07 (2000) (Japanese court

found Japanese store liable for discrimination against foreigners in violation of the International
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S
195).
8. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
9. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862-63 (E.D.N.Y.
1984); see also The Fanny, 22 U.S. 658, 669 (1824) (libel action against "a tortious possessor of
property" taken in breach of neutrality); PresbyterianChurch of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 320-21
(a violation of international law is the standard or substantive law to be applied); PAUST, supra note
2, at 14, 233-34, 312-14 nn.573-585; supra text accompanying note 3. The claim in Moxon v. The
Fanny was dismissed because the foreign claimants sought restitution of the property as well as
money damages, the district court stating:
Neither does this suit for a specific returnof property, appear to be included in the
words of the judiciary act of the United States, giving cognizance to this court of
"all causes where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations,
or a treaty of the United States." It cannot be called a suit for a tort only, when the
property, as well as damages for the supposed trespass, are sought for.
Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 947-948 (D.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9,895) (citations omitted).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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also creates a domestic cause of action or right to a remedy regarding
various violations of international law." Moreover, the need to provide

11. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 612 (9th Cir. 2003); Papa v.
United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002); Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d
1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001); Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir. 1998);
Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847-48; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236, 238; Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1474-75; Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 830 F.2d at 424-25; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,777-80
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-82, 884-85, 887;
Presbyterian Church ofSudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 320; Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157
F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359-60 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 441-43; Jama, 22 F.
Supp. 2d at 362-63; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 179; Paul, 812 F. Supp. at 212; Forti, 672 F. Supp.
at 1539-40; Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 279-80 (S.D. Cal. 1986); Handel v. Artukovic,
601 F. Supp. 1421, 1426-27 (C.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Greene, 26 F. Cas. 33, 33 (C.C.D.
Maine 1827) (No. 15,258) ("it gives... [a] right . .. to sue in those courts"); New England Ins. Co.
v. Detroit & C. Steam Nav. Co., 18 F. Cas. 64, 65-66 (N.D. Ohio 1871) (No. 10,154) (addressing
phrases in the 1789 version of section 9 of the judiciary act, including "causes when an alien sues
for a tort," and concluding that "[t]he term 'civil suit' was an apt and proper term, to describe all
these actions and causes ofactions." (emphasis added)); Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 943 ("where an alien
sues for a tort"); M'Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. 128, 128(D. S.C. 1794) (No. 6,810) ("sue here for
a tort ... the suit will be sustained"); Jansen v. The Vrow Christina Magdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356, 358
(D. S.C. 1794) (No. 7,216) ("the powers of the district courts are expressed .. . as to civil
causes ... where an alien sues for a tort only"); Bolchos,3 F. Cas. at 810 ("the original cause ... to
take cognizance of the cause"); Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 2 F. Cas. 80, 85 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1870) (No. 602) (similar to New England Ins. Co., Woodruff, J.: "The general term 'civil suit' was
apt to describe all these actions and causes of action, and it was so employed."), rev'd on other
grounds, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272, 303 (1873) ("the conclusion is inevitable that the terms 'civil
suit' .. . and 'civil actions' ... were intended to mean the same thing"); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250,
252-53 (1907) ("a forum and a right ofaction" (emphasis added)); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795)
("have a remedy by a civil suit" (emphasis added)); supra note 1 (the 1789 version contained the
informing phrase "all causes where an alien sues for a tort" (emphasis added)); PAUST, supra note
2, at 14-15, 229, 232-34, 286-88, 311, 314 n.584, 373-74, 391 n.101; Paust, Human Rights
Responsibilities, supra note 7, at 822 nn. 104 & 107; but see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798 (Bork, J.,
concurring). Judge Bork's view to the contrary in Tel-Oren was in error, opposed by Judge
Edwards, and has not been followed. See, e.g., Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 442 n.20 (in his "highly
criticized opinion ... Judge Bork's reasoning is flawed"); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238; Forti, 672 F.
Supp. at 1539. Judge Bork's opinion also contained several other errors, including (1) an
ahistorical statement that "in 1789 there was no concept of international human rights." Tel-Oren,
726 F.2d at 813; (2) An assertion that "international law does not ... recognize the capacity of
private plaintiffs to litigate its rules in municipal courts" or provide a cause of action. Id. at 822;
see also id. at 799-800, 813, 816. Concerning the first additional error, see, e.g., PAUST, supra note
2, at 195-202, 208-09, 236. Concerning the second additional error and treaty-based and customary
human rights to an effective remedy in domestic courts, see, e.g., id. at 224-29, 235, 314-16, 39192. The right of access to domestic courts and to an effective remedy concerning human rights
violations also happens to be part of human rights law. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, arts. 2(3)(a), 14(1), 50,999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 9, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR];
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, art. 8, at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948); General Comment No. 24, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc.
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aliens access to our courts so that the United States does not create a

"denial ofjustice"12 under customary international law was most likely one
of the primary reasons for adoption of the ATCA. 3

CCPR/C/Rev.1/add.6, paras. 8-9, 11-12 (2 Nov. 1994); Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d
71, 82 (Tex. 2000) ("The Covenant [ICCPR] not only guarantees foreign citizens equal treatment
in the signatories' courts, but also guarantees them equal access to these courts."); PAUST, supra
note 2, at 224-29; PAUST ETAL., supra note 7, at 72-73, 266-68, 273, 344, 459, 726; Paust, Human
Rights Responsibilities, supra note 7, at 822-23 n.108. Congress can create such causes of action
or rights to a remedy by incorporating international law which does so by reference even if the
statute had not itself created a cause of action. Supra text accompanying note 2.
12. Concerning "denial of justice," see, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 12, 225, 287-88 n.481;
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 711, cmts. a, c, e, RN
2 (3d ed. 1987).
13. See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782-83 (Edwards, J.) (quoting THE FEDERALISTNO. 80
(Alexander Hamilton)).
The union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of
its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied
with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion of justice by the
sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among
the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have
cognizance ....
Id. at 783. It also demonstrates why the first Congress was concerned with providing rights to
remedies for aliens as opposed to U.S. nationals, since a "denial of justice" under customary
international law only applied to aliens and a denial would set up a pretext for foreign states to
engage in armed or other forms of reprisal against U.S. shipping or elsewise against the United
States and its nationals. Further, this general purpose relates to the statute's extraterritoriality, given
the scope of U.S. responsibility for the conduct of its nationals abroad. See Henfield's Case, 11 F.
Cas. 1099, 1108 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Wilson, J.).
When the offending citizen escapes into his own country, his nation should oblige
him to repair the damage, if reparation can be made, or should punish him
according to the measure of his offence. Vatt. Law Nat. 75; Burrows, 1480; 4 Bl.
Comm. 68, 69. If the nation refuse to do either, it renders itself in some measure
an accomplice in the guilt, and becomes responsible for the injury. Vatt. Law Nat.
145. To what does this responsibility lead? To reprisals certainly (Vatt. Law Nat.
251); and if so, probably to war.
Id.; Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 216 (1828) (Story, J.) ("right of justice" re: violation
of international law); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,474 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) (noting that
the fact that the United States had a "duty to provide" that the laws of nations "be respected and
obeyed" and was "responsible to foreign nations" for their observance were among the reasons for
creation of the federal judiciary); Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810 ("failure of justice"); 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
106, 107 (1802) ("ought to take every reasonable measure to cause reparation to be made by the
offender"); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 30, 32 (1793) ("The laws of nations .. . do not allow reprisals, except
in case of . .. justice absolutely denied"); Resolution of the Continental Congress (1781), 21 J.
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The ATCA, as a governing Act of Congress, contains no list or
limitations of applicable customary international law or treaties of the
United States and expressly applies to "any" civil action for a tort in
violation of such international law.' 4 For 215 years, Congress has chosen
not to impose any limits on the ATCA's scope, including limits as to
subject matter, 5 its extraterritorial reach,'6 or its provision of a cause of
action or right to a remedy.17 At least for a quarter century, there has been
a "history of congressional acquiescence in" judicial application and the
reach of the ATCA, "Congress has implicitly approved," and "Congress
has not disapproved" general patterns of judicial use of the statute.' 8 More
recently, it appears that Congress reaffirmed the reach of the ATCA, since
House and Senate Reports concerning other legislation in 1991 expressed
congressional resolve that the ATCA "should remain intact."'9 One such

CONT. CONG. 1136-37 (1781) (regarding "infractions of the laws of nations" and "infractions of
treaties").
[A]s instances may occur, in which, for the avoidance of war, it may be expedient
to repair out of the public treasury injuries committed by individuals, and the
property of the innocent to be exposed to reprisal, the author of those injuries
should compensate the damage out of his private fortune.
Id. at 1136; THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264, 265 (James Madison) (failure of the Articles of
Confederation to address "the case of offenses against the law of nations . .. [will] consequently
leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations.");
PAUST, supra note 2, at 288 n.481; Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and The Founding

of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 63-66 (1988). Connecticut also had an early statute
providing a remedy for violations of the laws of nations injuring "any foreign Power or ... the
Subjects thereof." 1784 Conn. Pub. Acts 82, 83.
14. For the judiciary to add limits that Congress has not chosen would be to rewrite the clear
language of a long-standing federal statute and to violate the separation of powers. See also supra
text accompanying note 2.
15. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 3; infra text accompanying note 20.
16. See supra text accompanying note 3.
17. See supra text accompanying note 11.
18. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678, 680, 686-87 (1981).
19. Both the House and Senate Reports concerning enactment of the Torture Victim
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. V
1993)) express a congressional resolve that the ATCA "should remain intact to permit suits based
on ... norms [other than torture and extrajudicial killing] that already exist or may ripen in the
future into rules of customary international law." H.R. REP. No. 367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 4 (1991); S. REP. No. 249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (1991) (re: "cause of action that has been
successfully maintained under an existing law, section 1350," the ATCA "has other importantuses
and should not be replaced."); see also Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996)
("Congress endorsed the Filartiga line of cases"), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (adding: "[t]he
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pattern demonstrates that violations of international law actionable under
the ATCA have not been limited tojus cogens norms, and judicial creation
of such a limit would be contrary to the clear language of the ATCA and
violate the separation of powers.20 Moreover, at the time of formation of
the ATCA the notion of a complete enumeration or short list of human
rights would have been anathema to the Founders. Their generation knew
that no language was so copious as to enumerate human rights with
requisite latitude, a recognition that led them to adopt the Ninth
Amendment as a valuable part of the Bill of Rights to assure an
incorporation by reference of essential human rights for our people.2 ' The
same recognitions were true more generally with respect to the law of
nations.22 Still today, the general statute incorporating the laws of war by
reference as offenses against the laws of the United States does not attempt
to list the numerous war crimes proscribed by international law or to

&

scope of the Alien Tort Act remains undiminished by enactment of the" TVPA); Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 1998).
20. For cases and executive opinions addressing non-jus cogens violations, see, e.g., AlvarezMachain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 612-14 (9th Cir. 2003) (ATCA is not limited to jus
cogens, courts are "guided by the language of the statute, not an imported restriction"); AlvarezMachain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) ("never held that a jus cogens
violation is required"); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (imprisonment, among other violations); Weisshaus v. Swiss Bankers
Ass'n (In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig.), 225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000) (re: war crimes, among
other violations); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43 (war crimes); Nguyen da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d
1194, 1201-02 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975); Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. at 5, 7-8 (claims re: war
crimes, hijacking, mutilation, among others); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961)
(passport violations); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607); 26 Op. Att'y
Gen. 250 (1907); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795); see also M'Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas. 128 (D.
S.C. 1794) (No. 6,810); but see Doe v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000). With
respect to the separation of powers, see supra text accompanying notes 2, 14; infra text
accompanying note 24. Concerning various other early violations of international law, see, e.g.,
PAUST, supra note 2, at 7-8, 11-12, 59-61 nn.76-104, 193-210, 288-89, 323-24, 421-22, 434-35.
Concerning lists of normsjus cogens, see, e.g., id. at 371, 376-77 (including "arbitrary" detention);
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTED STATES, § 102, cmt. k, RNs 2, 6,
§ 702, cmts. a, n, RN 11.
21. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 198 (quoting Hamilton), 200-01, 219, 247-48 nn.90
92-93, 330-32, 350 nn.45 & 50; see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 421 (1793)
(counsel: Framers "must have viewed human rights in their essence, not in their mere form.").
Concerning human rights purposes of the other original amendments and the 13th, 14th, and 15th
amendments, see, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 200-01, 205, 219,248 nn.92-93, 275-76 nn.392-93.
22. See, e.g., id. at 7-9, 11-12, 59-61 nn.76-104; Resolution of the Continental Congress,
supra note 13, at 1136-37.
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identify their elements.23 Additionally, with respect to the separation of

powers, whether the reach of the ATCA (or any federal statute
implementing international law for civil or criminal sanctions) should be
amended because of foreign policy considerations is not an issue for the
courts.24
When identifying and clarifying customary human rights or other rights
under customary international law, one need only identify rights and a
generally shared core of normative content that are "sufficiently"
determinable even if ambiguity exists outside a core of generally shared
meaning." Further, as recognized in Filartiga, courts must use

23. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821; supra text accompanying note 2. The same congressional
scheme applies regarding 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
24. See also The Peterhoffv. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 28, 57 (1866) ("we administer
the public law of nations, and are not at liberty to inquire what is for the particular ... disadvantage
of our own or another country"). For more than 200 years, issues concerning the interpretation and
application of U.S. treaty law, customary international law as law of the United States, and U.S.
statutes have been issues of law for the courts to decide and they are textually and unavoidably
committed to the judiciary under the Constitution. See generally U.S. CONST. arts. III, § 2, VI, cl.
2; RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 11 (1)-(3), cmts.
c-e, RN 4, 113; PAUST, supra note 2, at 7-11, 38-59, 68-71, 317 n.598, 489-90, 493-94, 499-502,
507-10; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708, 714 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
116 (1895); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422-23 (1815); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199, 272 (1796) (Iredell, J.); The Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 1, 13 (Fed. Ct. App. 1781); Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 786 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799) (Curtis, J., on circuit), aff'd, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862); RodriguezFernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798-99 (D. Kan. 1980). The text and structure of the
U.S. Constitution also confirm judicial power andjurisdictional competence with respect to certain
suits "against ambassadors," "public ministers," and "foreign States," thereby also implicitly
recognizing that certain forms ofnonimmunity necessarily exist, all of which can implicate foreign
affairs. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). Further,
there is no "justifiable offense" to a foreign state when universal jurisdiction is exercised over
violators of international law found within our territory. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp.
860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); PAUST, supra note 2, at 305-07 n.547, 421-23 n.76, 445-46.
25. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 612 ("sufficient consensus," "sufficiently ...
defined," quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820)); Alvarez-Machain,
266 F.3d at 1050-53 (norm need not be specific in human rights instruments); Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)
("definable"); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J.) ("definable"); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-82 ("sufficiently determinate," "sufficiently . .
defined," quoting Smith); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185 (D. Mass. 1995) ("adequately
defined"); id. at 187 ("not necessary that every aspect... be fully defined"); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540-42 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("definable," "sufficient consensus to evince"); Forti
v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988) ("general recognition," "sufficient
to establish"); see also Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 ("must be ascertained and administered
by the courts"); Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163; The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 422; Kadic, 70 F.3d
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international law as it has evolved. 26 Customary international law is
universal and obligatory. Yet, contrary to a mistaken mantra proffered in
a few U.S. opinions that normative content should be based in "universal"

at 238 (courts ascertain the evolving content of the law of nations); cf id. at 239 ("wellestablished"). This approach to normative identification is consistent withjudicial power, since the
judiciary has the primary competence to identify and clarify the content of international law and that
power is constitutionally based because customary international law is part of the "laws of the
United States" within the meaning of articles III, § 2, and VI, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution. See,
e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 6-11, 38-39, 46-47, 50-64, 81-101 passim; RESTATEMENT OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTED STATES § 111, cmts. d-e, RN 4; Paust, Human Rights
Responsibilities, supra note 7, at 820 nn.93-94; see also John Jay's Charge to the Grand Jury of the
Circuit Court for the District of New York, Apr. 12, 1790, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURTOFTHE UNTED STATES, 1789-1800, at 25,27 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) ("we
were responsible to others for the observance of the Laws ofNations; and as our national Concerns
were to be regulated by national Laws national Tribunals became necessary for the Interpretation
& Execution of them both."). For these reasons, it would be error to claim that a norm should be
strictly or clearly defined with detail. Moreover, Congress chose not to do so, which is its
prerogative. See supra text accompanying note 2. Concerning the numerous types of binding and
nonbinding, ratified and unratified, U.S., foreign, and international instruments and opinions
(agreed to or opposed by the executive) that have been utilized since the Founding to objectively
prove customary international law, especially general patterns of opinio juris, see, e.g., Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-38 (1942); Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 687-701, 707, 711; The Scotia, 81
U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1871); Peterhoff, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 50; Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
at 160-81; Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 453; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238-43; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at
880-85; Rodriguez-Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 795-98; United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice
Case), III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NEURNBERG MILITARY TRIBuNALS UNDER

CONTROL CouNcIL LAwNo. 10, 1946-1949,3,979(1950) (the U.N. General Assembly "is the most
authoritative organ in existence for the interpretation of world opinion . . . [and] is persuasive
evidence" of opinio juris); PAUST, supra note 2, at 5-6, 27-36 nn.17-28 (citing numerous cases),
170-73, 175-76 (also addressing the "only 'where"' error); Jordan J. Paust, Paquete and the
President: Rediscovering the Brieffor the United States, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 981, 983-86 (1994)
[hereinafter Paust, Paquete and the President]. It is clearly erroneous to argue that only binding
instruments can be used to prove normative content. But see Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,
343 F.3d 140, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) ("only States that have ratified a treaty are legally obligated to
uphold the principles embodied in that treaty ... [and] a treaty will only constitute sufficient proof
of a norm . . . if an overwhelming majority of States have ratified the treaty, and those States
uniformly and consistently act in accordance") (emphasis omitted); id. at 168 ("General Assembly
documents are at best merely advisory, they do not ... evidence an intent by member States to be
legally bound by their principles, and thus give rise to rules of customary international law"); id.
at 169 ("Because neither of the declarations . .. created enforceable legal obligations, they do not
provide reliable evidence of customary international law"); see also infra text accompanying notes
27-28.
26. See, e.g., Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 281 (Wilson, J.) (the U.S. is "bound to receive the law
of nations, in its modern state"); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238, 241; Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777 (Edwards, J.);
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consensus, normative content need only be based in generally shared
patterns of legal expectation or acceptance.28

Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881; Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d
1250, 1263 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 2d 289, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Mariav. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206,233 (E.D.N.Y. 1999);
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999); Jama v. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp.
2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1998);
Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 179 n.18; Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1539; H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3-4
(1991), reprintedin 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86 (1992) ("norms ... may ripen in the future into rules of
customary international law"); PAUST, supra note 2, at 232, 311 n.562; Paust, Human Rights

Responsibilities,supra note 7, at 820 n.95; see also United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas.
832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (Story, J.: "at ... [a] subsequent period the principle
can be considered as incorporated into the public code of nations."). Since the Founding, it has
been understood that the meaning of customary international law and treaties can be dynamic. See,
e.g., PAUST, supranote 2, at 4-5, 61 n.103, 198 (quoting Hamilton), 311 n.562, 388 n.64; Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31 (1), (3)(a)-(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
27. The universal consent error is exemplified in the following four cases. [1] Flores, 343
F.3d at 154 ("only those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to," seriously misquoting
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 888 as if it was "holding that customary international law includes only
'well-established, universally recognized norms,"' but Filartigaactually adopted the Supreme
Court's "general" assent test (630 F.2d at 881), the Flores panel knew that this was the test in
Filartigaand the Supreme Court). See Flores, 343 F.3d at 145 (quoting Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881,
which had quoted United States v. Smith). Filartigawas only stating that "earlier cases did not
involve such well-established, universally recognized norms of international law that are here at
issue." Filartiga,630 F.2d at 888. Flores also proffered an erroneous view that practice has to be
universal. Flores, 343 F.3d at 154, 158, 160. See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1¶ 184, 186; PAUST, supra
note 2, at 5; RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102, cmt.
b; [2] Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 617, 619-20 (using a "universal" consent error); id. at 648,
650 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (arguing, completely contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Paquete Habanaand missing the unanimous expectations of the Founders and the judiciary for
some 200 years that the executive is bound by customary international law, that a norm "not
recognized by the United States cannot be deemed a universal one, actionable in this nation's
courts" and that "[i]t is not the judiciary's place to enforce such a norm contrary to" the will of the
executive); but see PAUST, supra note 2, at 7-11, 169-73, 175; Paust, Paquete and the President,
supra note 25; [3] Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1475 ("universally condemned"); [4] Xuncax, 886 F. Supp.
at 184, 187 ("universal, definable and obligatory" and "no state condone the act in question, and
there is a recognizable 'universal' consensus of prohibition against it," yet later in the opinion one
finds the statement that "[i]t is not necessary that every aspect ... be fully defined and universally
agreed upon") (citing Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1540). Forti'sphrase "universally condemned" was
actually changed to the correct test a year later. Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 709 ("plaintiffs need not
establish unanimity among nations. Rather, they must show a general recognition"). Forti, 672 F.
Supp. at 1540, merely cited Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881 (which had actually used the "general
assent" test) and Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring) (which had actually required
merely that the norm be "definable, universal, and obligatory," which customary international law
is (i.e., a "universal" or universally obligatory norm) when it is based in general patterns of opinio
juris;see, e.g., PAUST, supranote 2, at 3-5, 23-27 n.14, and cases cited). Moreover, Judge Edwards
did not state that the expectations must be "universal," but recognized the Supreme Court standard
in PaqueteHabanathat a norm can arise from "the general assent of civilized nations." Tel-Oren,
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726 F.2d at 789 (quoting PaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. at 694). See also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110
F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (false dictum: "states that refuse to agree ... are not
bound"); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (which had merely used
the universal "norm" focus of Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren, not a universal consent error, and had
used the test "standards of human rights that have been generally accepted - and hence
incorporated into the law of nations," although it had also referred to "such universally recognized
rights" (quoting Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985)). It is not clear
why or where this error originated, perhaps in California. Also, some might have confused the fact
that customary international law, once formed, creates a "universal" norm or obligation (although
regional custom does not) with the standard concerning opiniojurisfor formation of a customary
international legal norm, which merely requires that general patterns of supportive legal
expectation exist. See infra text accompanying note 28. This is evident as one traces the misuse of
the remarks by Judge Edwards and a shift from his focus on a "universal" norm, even noting that
the test for opinio juris requires merely "general assent," to the "universal" consent error - a
misrepresentation of a mantra. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 789. Repetition of the error in dictum did not
pose serious problems until its use recently in Alvarez-Machain to dismiss one of the plaintiff's
claims. See Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 617, 619-20 (stating that the court's review of materials
reveals no U.S. recognition of a prohibition of transborder abductions). This is strange, however,
because the United States had twice voted in favor of U.N. Security Council resolutions
condemning such abductions. See S.C. Res. 579, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/579 (1985)
(emphasis omitted) (the resolution created at the request of the United States recognizes that
"abductions are offences of grave concern .. . having severe adverse consequences for the rights
of the victims," "[c]ondemns unequivocally all acts of. . .abduction" and "[a]ffirms the obligation
of all States . .. to take all appropriate measures . . . to prevent the commission of acts of ...
abduction in the future"); S.C. Res. 138, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960) (re: kidnapping
of Eichmann; vote: 8-0-2, with abstentions by Poland and the Soviet Union, and Argentina not
participating); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702, cmt. h (quoting a statement of the U.S. Delegation regarding arbitrary detention); 4 JOHN
BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

§ 603,

at 330 (1906) (U.S. Secretary of State

recognition that it is not permissible to "arbitrarily abduct from the territory" of another state; and
U.S. protest of Canadian kidnapping from New York); Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and
IrregularExtradition, 36 BRrr. YB. INT'L L. 279, 284 (1960) (U.S. protest of British seizure in
United States in 1841); Jordan J. Paust, After Alvarez-Machain: Abduction, Standing, Denials of
Justice, and UnaddressedHuman Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHN'sL. REv. 551,561 (1993) (Secretary
of State Marcy protesting forcible abduction "violating ... the rights of humanity" in 1853). Some
might have feared a limitation on the right to capture bin Laden, al Odah, or others in a foreign
country. See Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 652 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). But such forms of
capture as measures of self-defense against those directly participating in ongoing armed attacks
are permissible under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and are not "arbitrary." See, e.g., Jordan J.
Paust, Use ofArmed ForceagainstTerroristsin Afghanistan, Iraq, andBeyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 533, 538-39 (2002); see also Jordan J. Paust, JudicialPower To Determine the Status and
Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARv. INT'L L.J. 503, 506-07 (2003) (whether
detention of alleged terrorists is "arbitrary" has to be considered in context and with reference to
various interests at stake); Paust, After Alvarez, supra, at 563, 566, 577-80 (not all captures would
constitute "arbitrary" detention or denials ofjustice).
28. With respect to proof of customary international law, all that is required is that there be
general recognition of or general consensus concerning a customary norm (i.e., general patterns
of supportive legal expectation or opiniojurisforming the core of normative content). See, e.g.,
Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 186-88, 190,202; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J.
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With respect to treaties, the Supreme Court has affirmed more generally
that treaty-based rights can be express or implied and that a treaty must be

construed by the courts in a broad manner in favor of rights that may be
claimed under a treaty.2 9 By express language, the ATCA covers "any civil

4, 41, 43-44; id. at 229-31 (Lachs, J., dissenting); Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (United Kingdom
v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 148-49; Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694 ("general assent"); Scotia,
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 187-88 ("generally accepted," "common consent of mankind"); Ware, 3 U.S.
(3 DalI.) at 227 ("established by the general consent of mankind"); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 789
(Edwards, J.) ("general assent"); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 ("general assent" quoting Paquete
Habana); Estate of Rodriquez, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 ("accepted by a 'generality' of states");
Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Xuncax, 886
F. Supp. at 187 ("It is not necessary that every aspect of what might comprise a standard [under
customary international law] be fully defined and universally agreed upon before a given
action ... is clearly proscribed under international law... .");Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 709 ("To meet
this burden, plaintiffs need not establish unanimity among nations. Rather, they must show a
general recognition among states that a specific practice is prohibited."); United States v. von Leeb
(The High Command Case) (1948), XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 462, 487-88 (1950) ("common ... general attitude of the citizens of states,"
"absolute unanimity among all states.. . is not required," "the general and considered opinions of
the people within states - the source" of international law); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS
62(5th ed. 1955) ("general recognition," "not necessary, to show that every state has recognized,"
"test of general recognition"); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 123 (2001); LUNGCHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 344-45 (2d ed. 2000);
ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 189-90, 197-98

(1971); PAUST, supra note 2, at 3-5, 14-15; PAUSTET AL., supra note 7, at 25, 35-36,83-84, 92-94,
96-98, 131; RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102, cmt.
c; but see supra text accompanying note 27.
29. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276,293-94 (1933); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279
U.S. 47, 51 (1929); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265
U.S. 332, 342 (1924) ("Treaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two
constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other
favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred."); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448-49
(1924) ("Construing the treaty liberally in favor of the rights claimed under it, as we are bound to
do...."); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,272(1890) ("where a treaty admits of two constructions,
one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is
to be preferred."); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483,487 (1879) ("Where a treaty admits oftwo
constructions, one restrictive as to the rights, that may be claimed under it, and the other liberal, the
latter is to be preferred."); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 249 (1830) ("Ifthe treaty admits
of two interpretations, and one is limited, and the other liberal; one which will further, and the other
exclude private rights; why should not the most liberal exposition be adopted?"); Owings v.
Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) ("Whenever a right
grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decisions
of the states; and whoever may have this right, it is to be protected."). Also, private duties pertain
even though there is no express mention of individuals or individual duties in a treaty. See, e.g.,
Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Wilson, J., on circuit);
Paust, The Other Side of Right, supra note 7, at 52 n.7.
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action .. . for a tort only, committed in violation of ... a treaty of the
United States," and therefore can be applied consistently with Supreme
Court principles of treaty construction to reach violations of express and
implied rights guaranteed in a treaty of the United States. 30 Moreover, the

reach of ATCA is broader. A relevant civil action is not limited to
violations of treaty-based rights but expressly extends to "any civil action
a treaty of the United
... for a tort . .. committed in violation of ...

States." 3 ' Furthermore, there is no limitation concerning the treaties of the
United States that are incorporated for such purposes by reference. Since
the ATCA thus expressly incorporates all treaties of the United States by
reference, it necessarily executes and implements for purposes covered by
the statute any treaty of the United States that would otherwise be fully or
partly non-self-executing. 32 With respect to non-self-executing treaties, this
is not a remarkable result, since the ATCA performs the very role that
implementing legislation generally plays by providing a cause of action or
a remedy. Importantly, it is not the prerogative of courts to rewrite the
ATCA to apply merely to some treaties but not to others. Additionally, it
is worth emphasizing that the International Covenant on Civil and Political

30. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
31. Id.; see PAUST, supra note 2, at 96-97 n.125; supra note 3.
32. See, e.g., Estate of Cabello, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359-60 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Ralk v.
Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000); PAUST, supra note 2, at 14-15, 65,
95-97, 233, 311-12 n.571, 373-74, 391 n.101; Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities, supra note
7, at 823 nn.109, 111.
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Rights is at most only partly non-self-executing. 33 In any event, it is
otherwise executed for civil sanction purposes by the ATCA.
Furthermore, when faced with a claim by the defendant in Filartigathat
the customary "law of nations forms a part of the laws of the United States
only to the extent that Congress has acted to define it,"34 the Second Circuit
opinion aptly noted: "This extravagant claim is amply refuted by the
numerous decisions applying rules of international law uncodified in any
act of Congress.... A similar argument was offered to and rejected by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Smith, ... and we reject it today.""3

33. See, e.g., PAUST, supranote 2, at 97,361-62, 373 (noting that a U.S. declaration of nonself-execution is expressly inapplicable to Article 50, which mandates (also in self-executing
language) that all of "[t]he provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal

States without any limitations or exceptions" (emphasis added); that the Executive Explanation
concerning the declaration of partial non-self-execution identifies a special meaning that the intent
was that the International Covenant would not itselfdirectly create a cause of action, thus allowing
other uses of rights under the treaty, including use of rights defensively or to limit governmental
power; and that the Executive Explanation concerning Article 50 was emphatic that "the Covenant
will apply ... the intent is not to modify or limit U.S. undertakings under the Covernant.... the
U.S. will implement its obligations under the Covenant by appropriate .. .judicial means, federal
or state."). Since the ATCA creates a domestic cause of action and expressly covers a violation of
any treaty of the United States, it is not that important whether the treaty also creates a cause of
action or whether the declaration is void as a matter of law because it is inconsistent with the object
and purpose of the treaty. Concerning the issue whether the declaration is void, see, e.g., PAUST,
supra note 2, at 363-69, 377.
One important provision reinvigorated by the express mandate of Article 50 of the International
Covenant and implemented through the ATCA requires "an effective remedy, notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity" and, thus, nonimmunity
for officials who violate the treaty. ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 2(3)(a). More generally, U.S. and
other courts use an ultra vires rationale to reach the same result or find the acts are "private," not
"public" protectable acts. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 306-07, 422, 435-39.
34. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980).
35. Id. at 886-87 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (a case
that assured judicial competence when customary international legal norms actually exist as
opposed to when significant splits obviate the existence of a pattern of opinio juris. See id at 428,
430 n.34); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 677 (1900); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388,
422 (1815); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199,227 (1796) (customary law of nations is universal
and binding); id. at 237 ("federal judges are bound"). For additional cases, see, e.g., Rose v.
Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 276-77 (1808); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 159-60
(1795); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 474 (1793); United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2
DalI.) 297, 299 n.I (C.C.D. Pa. 1793); Waite v. The Antelope, 28 F. Cas. 1341, 1341 (D.C.D. S.C.
1807) (No. 17,045); United States v. The Adriadne, 24 F. Cas. 851, 856 (D.C.D. Pa. 1812) (No.
14,465); Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1101-04 (Jay, C.J.); id at 1107-08, 1120 (Wilson, J.); PAUST, supra
note 2, at 7-12 passim; Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities, supra note 7, at 821 n.100; see also
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) ("From the very beginning of its history, this Court has
recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes,
for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as enemy
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In conclusion, the history of the ATCA is not unknown and is
informing; by enacting the ATCA, Congress exercised its constitutional
discretion to incorporate customary and treaty-based international law by
reference and Congress chose to keep the ATCA intact in the 1990s and
for more than 200 years. Since the 1790s, the ATCA has been known to be
extraterritorial in its reach and to be more than a jurisdictional statute,
since it provides a cause of action or right to a remedy. The ATCA is
implementing legislation and incorporates by reference and executes any
partly or fully non-self-executing treaty of the United States. Actionable
violations of international law are potentially many and can be committed
by U.S. or foreign private or public actors. It would be a violation of the
separation of powers for the judiciary to place limits on the reach of the
ATCA that have not been chosen by Congress, and the judiciary should
use international law as it has evolved and identify normative content that
is sufficiently determinable. Additionally, it would be an error to state that
either customary or treaty-based norms must be strictly defined, based in
universal consent, or universally practiced.
Particularly erroneous and threatening to the separation of powers and
the rule of law is a recent claim that a norm not recognized by the
executive or one contrary to its will cannot be customary international law
or actionable in our courts. 36 The uniform expectations and decisions of the
Founders, Framers, and the judiciary for some two hundred years,

&

&

individuals."). Of course, the ATCA is congressional legislation that incorporates customary
international law by reference. See supra text accompanying note 2.
Despite assertions of a few, customary international law has constitutional bases; is among the
"laws of the United States" within judicial power and binding on the executive; and is not
simplistically mere "common law" (with or without a statutory-base such as the ATCA). Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (addressing merely "common law"); United States v. Hudson
Goodwin, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 31, 32-33 (1812) (no mere "common law" crimes), and cases
addressing "maritime" law are irrelevant. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.)
467 (1826) (regarding prosecution directly under customary international law (after Hudson
Goodwin) and alternatively under a statute); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159,
161 (1820); PAUST, supra note 2, at 7-11, 39-43 n.50 (numerous cases demonstrate it is not mere
"common law"); id. at 50-51 n.60, 55-56 n.67, 169-73 passim; Jordan J. Paust, Customary
InternationalLaw and Human Rights Treaties Are Law of the UnitedStates, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L.
301, 308-13 (1999); but see Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1147-48 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Randolph, J., concurring) (using the mere "common law" error); BARRY E. CARTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 235, 237 (4th ed. 2003). Customary international law has also been
recognizably supreme vis-.6-vis the states since the Founding. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 7-8,
10, 53-54 n.63 (and cases cited), 116, 165-67 nn.134-35 (and cases cited), 208-09 passim.
36. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 646-48, 650 (9th Cir. 2003)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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including Justice O'Connor's recognition in an opinion in 1984,"7 have

been emphatic that the executive is bound by international law and the
judiciary has the power and responsibility to apply that law.38 Indeed, when
faced with a claim by the executive that the seizure of enemy alien vessels

abroad in time of war was lawful and that its view of customary
international law should apply, 39 the Supreme Court ruled that customary
international law opposed by the executive was controlling and that the
executive seizures were in violation of international law and void. 40 Under

the Constitution, it must not be otherwise, since Article II, Section 3
demands that the executive faithfully execute the laws, including
customary international law, 4' and Article III, Section 2 assures that the
competence to apply international law in cases before the courts is

textually committed to the judiciary. 42 To allow the executive to determine
what laws it will or will not obey, and to dictate how law should be
interpreted by the judiciary, would involve a radical violation of the
separation of powers unacceptable in a constitutional democracy.

37. See Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,261 (1984) (O'Connor,
J.) (recognizing that a relevant congressional-executive "arrangement" must not be "exercised in
a manner inconsistent with .. . international law.").
38. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 2, at 169-73, 180-87 nn.1-42, 489, 492-94.
39. The circumstance involved the height of executive powers, during a real war, involving
war tactics within a battle zone against enemy aliens abroad.
40. See, e.g., Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, 711; The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453
(1903) (Holmes, J.); PAUST, supra note 2, at 171-72, 174-77, 183-84 n.24; Paust, Paquete and the
President,supra note 25, at 983-86. The above cited materials also demonstrate that the Admiral
who seized the alien vessels and crew had warned that the ships and crew could aid the enemy, the
Secretary's clarification ofthe Admiral's warning and request for clarification quite openly assured
executive permission to seize vessels and crew that the Admiral thought should be seized, the
executive did not order release of the ships or crew, the executive continued to support the actions
as lawful executive actions throughout the litigation and during the 1903 decision of Justice
Holmes, and the executive's views concerning the content of customary international law were
incorrect and certainly could not be controlling.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.

42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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